The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy In Historical Perspective

I enjoyed this , it was engaging and thoughtful. Modern strategy it seems has been misused mis understood and simply not taught at staff colleges correctly. This book should be on officers reading lists...

Series of lectures on the subject. Interesting variety.

I am still immersed in this work, but it is not one that can be hurried. I suspect that I will only get to a fuller understanding of his thrust after a second or third reading.The semantics of language and their relevance to the ongoing direction of war in the 21st century as employed by the major powers is a theme that cuts through the book like writing through a stick of rock. Strachan looks at the ongoing relevance of Clausewitz, and at how the term strategy has been used and misused, leading to problems in the ongoing conflicts that have plagued our century. An argument is posited that politicians have muddied the waters somewhat, with the military colluding in this by failing to adequately defend their corner. To make successful war, there has to be a clear strategy in place - something that Germans never had in place in the second world war, and something that the Americans are currently struggling with (the "War on terror", aka "the long war"). Strachan argues that short wars tend to be successful, while protracted conflicts favour the defenders. So, you are pondering whether to buy this book. It is weighty and thought provoking, based around a series of lectures delivered by Strachan. The weightiness is also physical - it is pleasingly printed on good quality heavy paper, and equally pleasingly I have yet to spot a typo! It is a book with key observations onto the modern world, and as such inevitably feeds into current events. As somebody deeply interested in history I would heartily endorse this book. It is undoubtedly an impressive piece of work on an important area of human activity. It makes you think, and that in itself is a good thing. So why the 4 star review, and not the full five? Maybe I am marking it unduly harshly, but it is perhaps overly dense, requiring frequent re-reading of passages before moving on. It does feel an important, even seminal work for all that, and the ideas probably deserve a wider readership than it will probably reach. I for one am glad that I have bought it.

A timely review of the contemporary use military power at a time when there are no longer defined front lines. The author considers the roles of politicians and the High Command in the light of current operations in the Middle East. H e gives much food for thought and one would hope that his work is studied carefully by both wings go government thus avoiding a repetition of the shambles of the last ten years.

I have to praise the sellars as there was a problem (my mistake) and I contacted the sellars. They could not have been more helpful so I would recommend them for that. The book arrived within few days and in excellent condition - though not read it yet. Brilliant service!

Whoosh ! This is a high-powered, painstakingly researched, and precisely pitched tour-de-force about the sweep of war – going back certainly since the time of Clausewitz and right up until today. It’s by no means an easy read and I found that it demanded infinite levels of concentration in order to follow and understand the intricate threads, which it weaves. Though I am in no doubt about the prowess and expertise of the author, ultimately it was more difficulty than delight, and at its end I could not say that I understood more than when I started. The danger is that, though I accept that war is a complex and multi-faceted enterprise – something that this book demonstrates unfailingly – I suspect most people, like me, have a varied, but ultimately quite simple, assessment to make of war. I believe, unlike politicians from all political parties, that Joe Public can understand and discern far more than they are given credit for. So, what would be our tests for war, for instance. That it’s a ‘just’ war. That it has clear and readily demonstrable points for entry and exit with clearly defined objectives. That the leaders who call for war do so with a popular rather than a personal mandate and are worthy of the sacrifice that they call for from the magnificent military machines they deploy and of course the brave and worthy young men and women who may be killed or maimed. That the civilians in the invaded country can look forward to a better or more stable existence - post-war. That the invading troops are supported and show at all times that they are never so exposed as to demonstrate a shameful level of conduct which may damage the entire force to which they belong and the people who sent them. That political leaders are honest. That home nations can look forward to peaceful and more secure times as a result of their actions … For me the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts fail just about all these tests and the sight of George Bush which his grandstanding on the aircraft carrier – with magnificent printed banner ( I wonder that he must have brought this with him ! ) is hard to view. The Suez crisis, many would accept, was not our finest hour. Political leaders, who called for this, paid the final price when the Americans, probably correctly, pulled the plug on our escapades. It’s such a shame that Tony Blair did not have the moral courage to do the same rather than deviously following George Bush, in what was to many a misguided and ill-founded campaign that cost us dear in every sense. Even our special relationship was soon forgotten when PM Cameron was not given leave to launch into Syria - how glad we all are now that he wasn’t – and UK criticised by the Americans as they lauded their new best buddies, the French. My only moment of delight was the press conference when President Bush found himself dodging shoes thrown at him. I was just sorry that Tony wasn’t standing next to him and of course that they didn’t hit him!

great experience. fast and easy

A very perceptive, interesting and informative study by a very knowledgeable author, this book is worth reading for those interested in this topic, with (in my case) some sections to be re-read for clarity of understanding. However, my impression was some of the content appeared laboured and overworked, although compensated for by especially the chapters towards the end of the book.

Bel saggio.

An outstanding read for national leadership, strategic and security professionals. A detailed historical study leading upto a very relevant analysis of civil military relations for the modern day.

Many repetitions, and a sort of nominalistic approach that, in my humble opinion, overstates the importance of "the" right definition of strategy for achieving good results in the planning and direction of war (and since, in Strachan's view, many many authors and military and political practitioners had no or a wrong definition of strategy, they blundered - they should have asked him!). The study has not been written as a systematic treatment from a singl mould and from the first to the last page, therefore some topics often emerge, but are not dealt with thoroughly (e.g. the "nature" of war). All in all: two points.

While not perfect, certainly one of the best works on strategy I've read recently and possibly the best work on post-1945 strategic history I've read in a while. Two main flaws or issues of contention: Strachan's critique of civil-military relations is at times lucid, but at other times appears to come slightly off the rails. Second, the books origin as a (much altered and added too) collection of articles shows through in the many areas which it doubles back on itself covering ground previously well trodden, at times this is done to build on previously mentioned ideas, at other times it seems overly repetitive. On the whole it is an excellent assessment and critique of the recent history of Strategic Studies as a field, as a historian I find many of his disciplinary critiques of the history/IR balance quite convincing, but I suppose I'm biased.

I find this book matches the recommendations for it.